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Abstract 
This paper explores the relationship between administrative coordination of EU affairs at the national level and 
compliance with EU law. First, we develop two hypotheses about the impact of coordination: we expect that the 
strength of the coordination structure (level of centralisation and political support) will improve levels of transposition 
of EU law, but if and when the EU laws attain political salience and trigger political opposition coordination becomes 
irrelevant. We test these conjectures by an aggregate country-level analysis of transposition rates and a qualitative 
comparative analysis of eight cases covering two directives. Both analyses support our expectations that strong 
administrative coordination of EU affairs leads to smaller transposition deficits in the aggregate. However for highly 
salient directives that touch upon constitutional issues and trigger opposition from political actors outside the executive, 
administrative coordination cannot help. 
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Introduction 
The remarkable transformation of the post communist states which entered the European Union in 
2004 and 2007 involved, among others, achieving a surprising, for many observers, level of 
compliance with and transposition of the acquis communautaire. In its Internal Market report of 
July 2005, the European Commission commented that “the new Member States thus perform better 
in transposing Internal Market directives on time than the EU-15 Member States, despite having 
had to absorb the whole acquis in a short time frame”.  The Commission praised the record of the 
new member states even further by pointing out that that “the champions of reducing transposition 
deficit are almost all new member states” (Commission, 2005). Lithuania even came ahead as the 
best performer in transposition in the Commission internal market report in February 2006, while 
latecomer Bulgaria achieved a formal transposition deficit of zero in 2008. Given that Bulgaria has 
also received, post accession, several extremely serious warnings from the Commission regarding 
corruption, fraud with EU funds and problems with the judiciary, the question of the gap between 
formal transposition and real implementation post accession arises with new urgency. Several other 
CEE member states, such as Poland and Slovakia have been known to reverse some of the 
administrative rules and legislation they had adopted during the pre-accession period (The 
Economist, 2006, Dimitrova, 2007). Such developments indicate the need to research in some depth 
the post accession record of the ‘new’ EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
A great deal of the progress made during pre-accession can be attributed to administrative 
developments that ensured that the candidate states could support the negotiations by providing 
adequate information and at the same time disseminate policy decisions on transposition and 
harmonize their legislation with the acquis. The initial administrative condition of the EU, 
formulated in the Madrid European Council conclusions (1995) stated that the candidates needed to 
develop sufficient administrative capacity to implement the acquis communautaire. However, 
administrative capacity turned out to be a difficult concept to define, as the European Commission 
itself found when it struggled to outline the model and parameters of administrative reform 
expected from candidate members in the 1990s. The lack of a common European administrative 
model made it more difficult, but did not prevent administrative conditionality from being a major 
issue in the Commission’s regular reports. A first set of requirements requiring the adoption of 
broad civil service and administrative reforms was defined with the help of the baseline criteria   3
developed by the OECD’s SIGMA group (Dimitrova, 2002). At the end of the 1990s, however, the 
focus in Commission advice and candidates’ attention shifted to the administrative and political 
coordination of EU adaptation and to sectoral capacity. This led to an enormous development in 
sophisticated EU coordination mechanisms which often included levels of coordination and 
political attention unseen in the ‘older’ member states (Dimitrova and Maniokas, 2004, Dimitrova 
and Toshkov, 2007). EU related units in ministries and departments across the candidate states have 
become “islands of excellence” (Verheijen, 2000, 2001, World Bank, 2006) in the post communist 
administrations, employing highly trained, highly motivated staff, in order to perform well the 
multiple tasks related to the negotiation and adaptation process.  
 
Despite these developments, administrative capacity was, for the early years of the last enlargement, 
more a practical concern for experts and advisors than a topic for academic research. As the 
candidates completed their preparation and acceded to the Union, research started catching up with 
the increased focus on administrative capacity. While political veto players were shown to be of 
very limited significance in the pre-accession period (Dimitrova, 2002, Hille and Knill, 2006), 
administrative adjustment and especially new coordination mechanisms have been shown to have 
made a big difference to the ability of the new member states to take on board the acquis before 
accession (Zubek, 2001, 2005, 2008; Dimitrova and Toshkov, 2007, Hille and Knill, 2006). Zubek 
(2005, 2008), in particular, has shown that decisions to change Poland’s EU coordination structures 
and to make them more centralized and more political (upgrading the European core executive), has 
made a substantial difference for Poland’s transposition record. 
 
The question we ask in this paper is whether the institutional investment in coordination systems 
can explain the excellent record of the new member states in transposition of directives in the first 
few years post accession? At the same time, as conditionality is no longer a factor in compliance 
and as political actors in CEE states reassert their influence post accession, it is also important to 
ask if the established coordination systems are sufficient for good transposition. This paper deals 
with both questions by first exploring whether coordination levels just after accession are correlated 
with good transposition performance in the aggregate. Next, we explore in more depth eight case 
studies of transposition of two directives that have generated differing levels of political debate to 
see if administrative capacity in the narrow sense (coordination) is enough to explain these different 
cases of transposition.  
 
   4
The importance of coordination systems: theoretical considerations 
 
Despite the increased scholarly attention, administrative capacity has remained difficult to define in 
both practical and theoretical terms and consequently, its effects on performance have been found to 
vary depending on the measure taken. As Nicolaides has noted, it has not been easy to specify in 
detail a universally applicable measure of effective capacity to implement for practical policy 
purposes (2000:79). Research done by the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) 
suggests that legal instruments, institutional or organizational arrangements and coordination and 
consultation mechanisms all support the capacity to implement in a certain area (Nicolaides, 
2000:79). 
 
The quantitative analysis by Hille and Knill (2006) defines administrative capacity in a broader 
sense, as bureaucratic quality and uses the World Bank’s Governance Matters (1996-2004) Index as 
a measure of administrative capacity.  This indicator measures the independence of the bureaucracy, 
political stability, accountability and rule of law (Hille and Knill, 2006:544). Since the analysis of 
Hille and Knill finds that bureaucratic quality defined in this way has a significant aspect on 
transposition, it is a good start in grounding our assumptions that administrative capacity matters. 
The indicator used to measure the independent variable, however, is combined of so many variables 
that can be significant on their own that we find it tells us less than we would like to know about the 
key factors influencing transposition. Therefore, also taking into account the findings of Zubek on 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (2005, 2008), which explicitly highlight the role of 
administrative coordination, we explore EU coordination systems on their own. A final, practical 
argument for doing this is the European departments’ very separateness from the rest of the post 
communist administrations, their status of ‘islands of excellence’ (Verheijen, 2000) and the political 
attention dedicated to them in the crucial years just before accession. 
 
Therefore, in this paper, we explore whether it is sufficient to focus specifically on coordination of 
EU affairs when it comes to exploring administrative effects on transposition. We expect that the 
ddomestic EU co-ordination systems – their level of centralization, position in the administration, 
staffing and links with the core executive - would affect the transposition and implementation of EU 
law.   
 
In this section we will explicate the reasoning linking co-ordination systems and compliance with 
EU law and present several hypotheses that clarify the expected relationship and pose scope   5
conditions limiting the impact of co-ordinations structures. While in general we expect that stronger 
domestic EU co-ordination leads to greater compliance and less transposition delays, we also posit 
that the effect of co-ordination is conditioned on the political salience and political opposition 
towards the EU policy. With regards to directives with a low degree of political salience and no 
political opposition, strong co-ordination structure can influence positively the timeliness of 
compliance. Once the EU directives trigger political opposition by actors within the government or 
in the broader political system (presidents, second chambers, constitutional courts) then EU co-
ordination structures can do very little to settle the conflicts and speed up compliance. 
 
As we have noted above, in contrast to the overall attention for the impact of domestic institutional 
structures on implementation (see the recent overview in Steunenberg and Toshkov, forthcoming), 
attention to the impact of EU co-ordination structures has been scant. A notable exception is 
Giulliani (2004) who tests the ‘centrality of the Foreign Affairs ministry in the EU coordination 
structure’ expecting a negative impact on compliance, but the empirical evidence he finds is 
inconclusive. In the same study, based on data on the EU member states before 2004, he finds that 
stronger national co-ordination capacity has a negative influence on the standardized index of 
national adaptation that he uses as an indicator of compliance. Both measures of co-ordination type 
and capacity are based on the empirical work collected in the volumes edited by Kassim et al. 
(2000, 2001). 
 
The relative lack of theoretical and empirical research on the impact of co-ordination structures is 
puzzling given the obvious causal mechanisms linking EU co-ordination within the executive and 
compliance with EU law. Co-ordination systems can (1) provide technical assistance and expertise 
in EC law to the line ministries; (2) affect the information flows between governmental units; (3) 
provide monitoring and early warning systems for the overall level of implementation within the 
country; (4) enhance the communication between the government and the EU; (5) focus attention 
and assign priority; (6) facilitate settling conflicts between different parts of the executive.  
 
On a more abstract level, co-ordination institutions can affect the relative importance of the 
substantive policy concerns of the national government vis-à-vis the concerns about the timeliness 
and appropriateness of compliance (Toshkov 2009). Strong EU co-ordination bodies can put 
pressure on the Ministry of Transport, for example, to sacrifice some policy adaptation of the EU 
directive to be downloaded in order to speed up the transposition. In addition, powerful co-
ordination actors can ‘persuade’ the line ministry to stick close to the literal interpretation of the EU   6
law in the process of transposition in order to avoid risks of subsequent challenges by the European 
Commission and delays in the implementation of the directive. Essentially, when they are well 
developed, co-ordination structures within the national executives are separate actors with a focus 
on and vested interest in the smooth compliance with EU law. As opposed to line ministries and 
agencies which care primarily about the substance of the policy within their realms, the co-
ordination bodies’ overarching interests are to ensure timely and proper adaptation to the EU.  
 
Even if we assume that compliance with EU policies works according to different logics of 
compliance in different parts of the EU, co-ordination structures retain their importance
2 (Falkner et 
al. 2005). In the ‘world of neglect’ the information-providing and attention-drawing functions of 
coordination bodies are the most important ones. Since the major stumbling blocks for compliance 
are the negligence of the administration and the disregard to their European commitments, co-
ordination units can ensure that line ministries are well aware of their EU-related responsibilities 
and that commitments to transpose, implement and enforce legislation are integrated into the 
working programmes of the ministries. In the world of domestic politics the capabilities of co-
ordination systems to arbitrate conflicts and facilitate agreements between different arms of the 
executive are of prime importance. Because in the world of domestic politics gridlock over the 
interpretation of the EU law is the most likely cause of compliance troubles, co-ordination 
structures have a crucial role in providing negotiation arenas and facilitating the search for a 
solution of the inter-departmental conflicts. Once the conflicts escape the realm of the executive, 
however, and become politicized, the influence of EU co-ordination structures dwindles (see 
below). In the world of law observance the main contribution of co-ordination structures is to 
ensure swift information and communication flows between different national actors and between 
the EU (represented mostly by the Commission) and the government. Even if we are willing to 
accept that the post-communist countries from CEE are to be separated in a separate world of 
compliance – the world of dead letters – co-ordination structures remain important actors because 
they concentrate and distribute technical knowledge and expertise about EC law.  
 
The above discussion leads us to adopt the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: On the aggregate level, stronger domestic EU co-ordination structures are related to fewer 
delays and problems with EU law compliance. 
  
                                                 
2 It is unclear, however, whether we should consider the EU co-ordination strength as endogenous or exogenous to the 
‘world of compliance’.    7
The hypothesis implies cross-sectional differences between countries, but also diachronic 
differences within the same country provided that the level of co-ordination changes. Since we do 
not conceive strong co-ordination as both a necessary and sufficient condition for timely 
compliance but as a contributing factor – one amongst many causes determining the level of 
compliance – the effect of co-ordination strength should be modest in size and possibly difficult to 
uncover in aggregated data on transposition and implementation.  
 
In order to gain more analytical leverage over the link between co-ordination structures and 
compliance we need to consider more carefully the causal mechanisms linking these two variables. 
The discussion above portrays compliance as a primarily bureaucratic exercise confined within the 
executive. It is a game played between various actors within the government and the Commission, 
but still a game that does not leave the terrain of the executive. For the bulk of EU legislation this 
picture is most likely sufficiently realistic. A large number of EU directives deals with issues that 
do not touch broader political and societal interests. Despite the inroads made by EU legislators into 
policy areas like immigration, equal treatment, or social policy (e.g. working time), the proportion 
of EU rules that address technical issues remains great. Even when the EU tackles problems that are 
broadly relevant, the contributions of EU law are often marginal and do not challenge 
fundamentally the established national policies
3. This is not to say that EU law deals with 
unimportant problems, but that its directives more often than not do not attain critical salience in the 
attention of politicians and society.  
 
Some EU laws, however, do reach a high level of political salience touching upon constitutionally 
enshrined rights or key domestic norms and triggering political reactions. When salience is coupled 
with opposition to the European policy, we expect delayed and incorrect transposition and 
implementation to occur. Salient issues are more likely to have to go through lengthy legislative 
procedures involving more veto players. The transposition of these directives might require super-
majorities within the legislatures. Depending on the domestic system of political institutions it 
might involve powerful legislative second chambers with powers of veto or delay, or strong 
presidents whose agreement is necessary for the completion of the policy process. Furthermore, 
salient political issues might become entrapped in judicial oversight procedures, and actors like the 
president can trigger interventions by the constitutional courts. All these ‘paths to trouble’ lead to a 
rather different causal process determining compliance outcomes. A different causal structure is 
switched on once the genie of EU law is out of the bottle of bureaucratic policy-making.  
                                                 
3 A good case in point is the recently published case study of the adoption of EU corporate governance and its 
implementation in France (Ben 2009).   8
 
Post accession, we expect co-ordination structures can do very little to solve compliance problems 
raised by political opposition. There are several reasons why we think administrative coordination 
does not solve transposition delays when a politically sensitive topic is involved. 
 
First of all, political parties in the legislatures (especially if they are not represented in the 
government) and presidents are hardly susceptible to the influence of bureaucratic coordinating 
bodies. While co-ordination structures can sometimes arbitrate sectoral interests within the 
government, they have no power and influence to enhance settling genuine political conflicts. These 
different types of conflicts would not be a result of miscommunication or information flow failures, 
but a product of the clash between opposing preferences and interests.  
 
Second, co-ordination structures lack the institutional means to intervene once the compliance 
process has escaped the executive realm. They can at best advise legislatures to speed-up 
discussions, but they cannot speed up institutional procedures or pressure presidents or courts to 
deliver their opinions faster. While close involvement of the parliament in the co-ordination of EU 
policy during the ‘uploading’ phase (as in Denmark) should certainly help in avoiding conflicts with 
(or within) the legislature during the ‘downloading’ phase,  in the new member states such patterns 
of decision making have yet to become part of policy practice even where they formally exist.  
 
Thirdly and finally, for highly politically-salient issues the capacity of co-ordination units to ensure 
smooth compliance is severely limited even within the government itself. Salient issues are 
monitored by the media and the public, and governing parties are less sensitive to considerations 
like honoring their EU commitments in a timely and proper fashion and more sensitive to the 
attitudes in the domestic public sphere. When sectoral conflicts are reinforced by coalition politics 
within government, the interventions of co-ordination bodies are less likely to succeed.  
 
These considerations lead us to formulate the second hypothesis: 
 
H2: The positive influence of domestic EU co-ordination structures on compliance is absent in 
cases of high political salience and political opposition.  
 
The second part of this paper tests empirically these two hypotheses and explores the influence of 
co-ordination structures on compliance with EU law in the post-communist states from CEE   9
 
 
Research design and operationalization 
 
The empirical analysis presented in the following pages is divided in two parts. The first part looks 
for a relationship between co-ordination and compliance at the aggregate level – it compares the 
performance of countries synchronically, and over time. The first part of the analysis therefore 
focuses on the first hypothesis. Because it is not possible to measure political salience for 
aggregated data, the second hypothesis is explored in the second part of the empirical analysis 
which presents a comparative case-study designed to test specifically this conjecture. In this section 
we provide details about the research design, the operationalization and the measurement of the 
variables we use. 
 
Operationalizing coordination levels 
 
The main distinction which practitioners and experts have made in the context of EU politics is one 
focusing on the organizational location of the main co-ordaining unit. Simplifying substantially, we 
can distinguish between systems attached to the foreign affairs ministry (FAM), the government 
(council of ministers) office, or the office of the prime minister. Furthermore, EU co-ordination 
might be housed in a separate institution. In practice, real co-ordination systems involve elements 
located in various organizations, so it is a matter of subjective judgment which element is the 
leading one. Classifying co-ordination structures in this manner simplifies a lot the complex reality 
of EU co-ordination but it taps the main differences between the types of EU co-ordination.    
 
Table 1 presents the co-ordination types in the eight countries from CEE which joined the EU in 
2004. These structures changes quite often, so we have presented the organizational location of the 
main coordinating unit for two points in time: 2004, 2006, and late 2008. For details about the 
situation in 2004 the reader is referred to Dimitrova and Toshkov (2007). The most notable changes 
post 2006 include a change of the location of the central coordinating unit in Hungary from the old 
Foreign Ministry centre to the Prime Minister’s office and back to the Foreign Ministry in January 
2008. 
 
 
Table 1 Location of the main coordinating body for EU affairs 
  2004 2006 2008   10
Czech Republic  Foreign affairs ministry / 
cabinet office 
Foreign affairs ministry / 
cabinet office 
Foreign affairs ministry / 
cabinet office 
Estonia  Prime minister’s office  Prime minister’s office  Prime minister’s office 
Hungary  Foreign affairs ministry  Cabinet office  Foreign affairs ministry 
Latvia  Prime minister’s office  Foreign affairs ministry  Foreign affairs ministry 
Lithuania  Prime minister’s office  Cabinet office  Cabinet office 
Poland  Cabinet office  Cabinet office  Cabinet office 
Slovakia  Foreign affairs ministry  Foreign affairs ministry  Foreign affairs ministry 
Slovenia  Cabinet office  Cabinet office  Cabinet office 
 
 
In this paper, however, we go further than classifying structure by type and make an important 
distinction here between co-ordination type and co-ordination strength. This makes for difficult 
operationalization as different organizational form may be equally effective depending on the 
administrative system they are embedded in. Examples from ‘older’ member states include very 
effective, but weakly centralized coordination systems such as the one of Denmark or a more 
politically centralized system used by Spain (Steunenberg and Voermans, XX). 
 
Existing classifications referring to strength include the work by Scharpf (1993) and Metcalfe 
(1994). Scharpf has developed an abstract classification which provides insight into the effects and 
mechanisms of co-ordination but the typology is difficult to operationalize with the available data 
on real co-ordination structures. Furthermore, the typology is based on a distinction between 
systems of positive and systems of negative co-ordination that might not capture the bulk in the 
variation in the existing systems of domestic EU coordination
4.  Metcalfe (1994), on the other hand, 
has developed a scale for measuring the level of coordination which has been used as a starting 
point by recent work on coordination in the broader EU context (World Bank, 2006, Jordan and 
Schout, 2008). The lowest levels of his scale describe loose forms of coordination, while higher 
levels describe more tightly integrated systems that can manage more complex coordination 
challenges. 
 
The only available source which assigns scores to the countries we investigate bases them on the 
Metcalfe scale. The World Bank (2006) report ‘EU-8: Administrative Capacity in the New Member 
States: The Limits of Innovation’ assigns individual scores for the countries studied on overall 
coordination and separately, for EU coordination. The Report distinguishes between a country’s 
overall coordination capacity and coordination of European Integration/EU related issues.  
                                                 
4 Systems of positive co-ordination allow for exploring different solutions and proactively searching for a Pareto-
optimal solution. Negative co-ordination systems only avoid negative externalities during the process of co-ordination.   11
For the purposes of identifying, a priori, which new member states have the best developed 
coordination systems, we use the scores developed in the report, if necessary adjusted in view of 
recent changes.  
 
The coordination scores are based on the coordination levels identified by Metcalfe which range 
between one and eight. The data on which the scores are based in the World Bank report is derived 
from in-depth case studies and existing secondary sources. Table 2 presents the score for the year 
2006. According to the table, the Czech Republic has the lower score, while Lithuania has the 
greatest. Using additional information from governmental documents and other secondary sources 
we have updated the scores for the year 2008, and these are resented in the rightmost column. The 
Czech Republic has its score improved because it has strengthened coordination units and has 
created a ministerial post to oversee politically the coordination of EU affairs Hungary’s lower 
score is based on moving structures back and forth which must have affected organizational 
continuity. Reports of changes under way in Latvia and Lithuania are not reflected here as these are 
most recent developments from 2009. 
 
Tables 2 EU coordination levels in CEE 
 2006  2008 
Czech Republic  2  3 
Estonia  3  3 
Hungary  5  4 
Latvia  7  7 
Lithuania  8  8 
Poland  4  4 
Slovakia  3  3 
Slovenia  5  5 
 
Even though the table above provides scores adjusted till 2008, we use the 2006 scores for our 
analysis, as the changes post 2006 are not so extensive and the period is small for any effect to be 
measured on the aggregate transposition levels. 
 
Regarding the dependent variable, levels of transposition compliance, we operationalize and 
measure compliance using the data provided by the Internal Market Scoreboards. The Scoreboards 
are compiled by DG Internal Market of the European Commission and track the number of non-
transposed directives in each of the member states of the EU. The Scoreboards are updated twice a 
year and provide relatively reliable and comparable information. Arguably, they present the best   12
aggregate-level data on the transposition of EU law over time in the 27 member states available to 
date. Other existing databases suffer from inconsistencies between the reports (the data provided by 
the General Secretariat of the Commission), cover only selected policy sectors (Falkner et al. 2005, 
Haverland et al., forthcoming), and/or provide only snapshots at one particular point of time 
(Koenig and Luetgert 2009). Since the number of country-cases is extremely small (eight) we 
analyze the relationships between co-ordination type, strength and transposition with the help of 
scatterplots. 
 
According to the theoretical discussion, the effect of coordination structures on compliance is 
mediated by the influence of political salience. We have no way of operationalizing and measuring 
political salience for the aggregate-level analysis. Hence, we introduce a second analysis which is 
based on a comparative case study approach. We select a number of cases which cover different 
combinations of the causal factors identified in the theoretical section above. 
 
Table 3 Case selection for the comparative case study 
 
Country Directive  Coordination 
strength 
Political salience  Political opposition 
Czech Republic  Racial equality  2 / WEAK  YES  YES 
Estonia  Racial equality  3 / WEAK  YES  YES 
Hungary  Racial equality  5 / STRONG  YES  NO 
Latvia  Racial equality  7 / STRONG  YES  YES 
Czech Republic  Vibration   2 / WEAK  NO  NO 
Estonia Vibration  3/  WEAK  NO  NO 
Hungary  Vibration   5 / STRONG  NO  NO 
Lithuania Vibration  8  /  STRONG  NO  NO 
 
Altogether we have eight cases which cover transposition performance with regards to two 
directives – Directive 2000/43/EC on racial equality and Directive 2002/44/EC on protection of 
workers from vibration. We choose these directives because they provide contrasting levels of 
political salience. While the racial equality directive touches on constitutional issues for all member 
states and did spur political debate in the four countries we selected – the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, and Latvia, the transposition of the vibration directive went virtually unnoticed by 
political actors in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Lithuania. In principle we have more 
cases than needed to test the two hypotheses outlined above (the minimum number would have 
been four), but since our theory implies probabilistic and not deterministic relationships we have   13
included another set of four cases. The case of transposition of the Directive on racial equality in 
Hungary is also interesting because it presents a situation in which political salience was attained, 
but there was no opposition to the directive. Hence, this case is useful in evaluating the expectation 
that salience as such is not sufficient for troubles, but when in combination with opposition leads to 
delays. In the case studies we are able to bring a lot of contextual information in order to assess the 
outcomes in terms of compliance which we seek to explain.  
 
Analysis 
Country level 
 
We start the empirical analysis by investigating the link between coordination structures and 
compliance at an aggregate level. Because of the constraints of having only eight countries, a full-
fledged statistical model would be superficial. We opt to present a scatterplot instead and root the 
discussion in this figure. Figure 1 presents the relationship between coordination levels (strength) 
represented on the x-axis and compliance (the y-axis). As mentioned, the scores for coordination 
levels are based on research by the World Bank and the scale developed by Metcalfe (1994). 
Compliance is measured by the number of non-transposed directives at the end of 2006/beginning 
of 2007. Each country is represented by a symbol on the graph, and the different symbols stand for 
different types of coordination structures. 
 
The figure reveals a very strong link between coordination strength and the number of non-
transposed directives at this particular point of time. The biviarate correlation coefficient is -0.80 
which indicates a very strong negative relationship. In fact only Slovakia does not quite fit the 
pattern having a better transposition performance then we would expect from its EU coordination 
level. On the other hand, as expected, there is no direct link between the type of co-ordination 
structures and the compliance level
5. The two coordination systems located in the foreign affairs 
ministry exhibit good performance while the mixed system in the Czech Republic has the worst 
score. Cabinet or prime minister office-based systems of domestic EU coordination have excellent 
(Lithuania) next to mediocre (Hungary) next to rather poor
6 scores.
7 
 
                                                 
5 There is also no direct link between coordination type and strength which confirms that these are two separate 
characteristics of coordination structures. 
6 We would like to emphasize that we do not imply any normative judgments about the quality of the adaption of the 
new member states to the EU although we sometimes use adjectives like ‘excellent’ or ‘poor’.  We only refer to the 
relative country performance in terms of transposition timeliness as reflected in the Commission’s databases. 
7 The ranking is only relative to the sample of eight post-communist member states – in fact all the countries with the 
exception of the Czech Republic do rather well in comparison with the rest of the EU member states.   14
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How robust is the relationship between coordination levels and transposition? Is the strong link 
revealed in Figure 1 sensitive to changes in the particular year at which the measures are taken? In 
order to answer these concerns we averaged the number of non transposition acts over the period 
from the beginning of 2005 until the end of 2007 (six measures for each country). Figure 2 plots the 
result: the only difference with Figure 1 is that the y-axis features the average number of 
transposition acts from 2005 to 2007 instead of the levels of non-transposition at one particular 
point of time (January 2007). The relationship between coordination levels and transposition 
performance remains strong albeit the size of the correlation coefficient has dropped to -0.71. We 
should be noted, however, that our measure of coordination levels is fixed and available at only one 
time point, so that might explain the reduced strength of the relationship with complaisance.  
   15
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So far we have established that the aggregate country-level transposition performance of the eight 
post-communist countries which joined the EU in 2004 is strongly related to the domestic EU 
coordination strength (levels) as measured by the World Bank (2006), but not to the type of 
coordination structure. The relationship is robust to the specific points of time at which 
transposition is measured. Before we offer a causal interpretation of the link, however, several 
caveats are due.  
 
First of all, it could be that the scores of coordination levels are not entirely exogenous to the 
transposition performance. While the World Bank experts which have compiled the measurement of 
coordination levels have relied on a wide range of information, it is conceivable that explicitly or 
not they have taken account the transposition performance of the countries in their assessment of 
coordination strength. If this would be the case we would over-estimate the relationship between the 
two variables.  
   16
In addition, the link between compliance and coordination might be due to the two variables being 
simultaneously determined, or strongly influenced, by a third factor excluded from the analysis. It 
could be, for example, that general government capacity affects both coordination levels and 
transposition performance but there is no direct link between the latter two. Using measures of 
government effectiveness from the World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufman et al. 2005) we 
test for this possibility but we find the relationship between coordination and transposition remains 
strong
8. Hence, we can rule out that the link between coordination and transposition can be 
explained away when government effectiveness is taken into account. Similarly, we might 
hypothesize that the overall level of EU support and ambition in a country determines both the level 
of coordination of EU affairs and transposition success. Again, testing for the possibility (using the 
support for the EU at the accession referenda as an indicator of popular EU support – see Toshkov 
2009) we find out the relationship between coordination and compliance remains strong
9 and is, 
therefore, robust to the inclusion of this possible confounding variable.  
 
Although these robustness checks lend support to the conclusion that the link between coordination 
and transposition is strong, we should still be careful in endorsing a causal interpretation of the 
relationship. Time series data would provide crucial evidence to complement the cross-sectional 
analysis that we presented. Unfortunately, we only have only one set of measures of coordination 
levels which does not allows us to perform a time series analysis. Nevertheless, informal 
observation suggests that decreases in the coordination levels can be related with drops in 
transposition performance – for example, the below par performance of Lithuania in terms of 
transposition from July 2007 until the end of 2008 seem to follow decreases in the strength of the 
central EU coordination body in the country. Similarly, improvements in the Czech transposition 
record coincide with upgrades of the coordination system. A systematic time series analysis, 
however, has to wait until more data becomes available.  
 
Another way in which we can gain more confidence in the effect of coordination levels on 
compliance is to focus on the causal mechanisms and scope conditions. If our theoretical reasoning 
is correct, we should observe an effect of coordination levels at the aggregate level, and for 
technical, low salience legislation, but the effect should disappear when the EU law to be 
                                                 
8 We construct a Poisson regression model, which is suitable for count data, with government effectiveness and 
coordination levels as explanatory variables and the mean level of non-transposed acts 2005-2007 as a dependent 
variable. The coefficient of coordination levels is negative and statistically significant. 
9 Again, employing a Poisson regression model with the share of ‘Yes’ votes at the accession referenda and 
coordination levels as explanatory variables we find that coefficient of coordination levels is negative and statistically 
significant (as is the coefficient of the EU support variable).   17
downloaded gains political salience and triggers political opposition. The second part of the 
empirical analysis focuses on that conjecture (formulated as hypothesis 2 in the theoretical section 
of the paper). 
 
Comparative case study 
 
Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is a methodology that is especially useful when we have a 
moderate number of cases, and we expect that our explanatory variables have complementary, 
multiplicative effects (Ragin 2000). Apparently, QCA fits well our research objectives in this paper 
and can effectively complement the aggregate-level analysis that we offered above.  
 
In order to optimize the analytical leverage of the QCA approach we have to select cases that 
exhibit all the potential combinations of our explanatory variables. In our cases, we need at least 
four cases to test our two hypotheses: namely two cases of weak coordination capacity but varying 
political salience & opposition and two cases of strong coordination capacity and different values 
on political salience & opposition. It should be reminded that opposition only enters into the picture 
if salience is high. Because our argument is not strongly deterministic – we do not claim that all 
cases of transposition delays and implementation problems should feature political opposition or 
lack of coordination capacity, we include another set of four cases to increase the confidence in our 
findings. The case of the racial equality in Hungary serves, in addition, to explore the situation in 
which there is political salience but no real opposition to the EU directive. According to the most-
similar system design, we should keep the cases as similar as possible with regards to their other 
characteristics in order to lessen the chance of alternative explanations of the differences in 
compliance we find. Therefore, we choose two EU directives that are part of the same policy 
domain at the EU level (social policy) and are adopted and transposed in the same time period. 
 
QCA allows us to represent the variables ether as binary (yes/no, 0/1) or to assign them fuzzy score 
which can capture in with more detail whether an observation is ‘in’ or ‘out’ a certain set (Ragin 
2000). For reasons of simplicity we opt to work with crisp sets and, therefore, conduct the analysis 
using simple yes/no measures of the variables. Coordination strength is deemed as ‘present’ if the 
value of the coordination level is equal or greater than five and as ‘absent’ otherwise. Therefore the 
Czech Republic and Estonia are assigned ‘0’ and Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania are assigned ‘1’. 
The scores on political opposition and salience are derived form detailed case studies summarized 
later in the paper. The outcome ‘transposition delay’ is coded as ‘1’ (present) if the directive was   18
not transposed within the set deadline in the country and ‘0’ otherwise. Table 4 summarizes the 
scores on the explanatory variables and the outcome together with the theoretical expectations about 
transposition delay.  
 
Table 4 Result of the qualitative comparative analysis 
Country Directive 
Coordination 
strength 
(COORD) 
Political 
salience 
(SAL) 
Political 
opposition 
(OPPOS) 
DELAY 
(expected) 
DELAY 
(finding) 
Czech Republic  Racial equality  0  1  1  1  1 
Estonia Racial  equality  0  1 1  1  1 
Hungary Racial  equality  1  1  0  0  0 
Latvia Racial  equality  1  1  1  1 1 
Czech Republic  Vibration   0  0  0  1  1 
Estonia Vibration  0  0 0  1  1 
Hungary Vibration    1  0  0  0  0 
Lithuania Vibration  1  0  0  0  0 
 
Analyzing the truth table we derive the following results: 
 
DELAY → (SAL AND OPPOS) OR (~SAL AND ~OPPOS AND ~COORD) 
 
The ‘~’ before a variable indicates the absence of a condition, AND and OR are Boolean operators. 
The statements can be translated as follows: Delay is a result of the simultaneous presence of 
political salience and opposition, or the combination of weak coordination, no opposition and no 
salience. So, we can identify two paths to transposition delay – political opposition for salient 
legislation, or weak coordination in the absence of salience and opposition. The conclusion about 
coordination strength is straightforward: weak coordination is a necessary condition for delays for 
cases that do not reach political salience but is irrelevant for cases that do reach salience and trigger 
opposition. The result also shows that political salience and opposition are jointly sufficient to cause 
compliance troubles. In the absence of opposition, however, salience is not enough to bring delays. 
As we do not have combination of cases with low salience and political opposition, we cannot reach 
a conclusion about the effect of political opposition in the absence of salience
10. In short, all eight 
cases conform to our theoretical expectations. Therefore, we find no evidence against our two 
                                                 
10 In addition, if we bring the type of coordination in the truth table, the results would not change: in cases of political 
salience and opposition, the coordination type apparently does not matter since the three cases fitting the description 
have rather different coordination types (mixed, prime minister's office, and foreign affairs based). The second causal 
combination also features two countries having different types of coordination which shows that type is irrelevant. 
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hypotheses. The strength of EU coordination institutions is important for compliance but only when 
the process does not trigger political attention and opposition.   
 
Since the conclusion is based on only eight cases we should remain cautious about the confidence 
we can have in the result. Ideally, when tested on a large number of individual cases, the necessary 
and sufficiency of the causal configurations will remain visible, although we can not expect a 
perfect correspondence between causal paths and outcomes. Future analyses can also improve on 
the discrete measurements employed here and utilize fuzzy set analytical techniques. The 
combination of comparative case studies with the aggregate-level analysis presented earlier in this 
section, however, has brought substantive evidence that the theoretically plausible impact of EU 
coordination strength (but not organizational type) on compliance receives empirical support from 
the analyses of transposition of EU law in the new member states from CEE. The paper has brought 
ample data that better coordination is translated into better overall levels of compliance although for 
highly salience legislation the link might be absent. 
 
In the last part of the paper, we provide some empirical details in the case studies that can serve as 
an illustration of the causal connection we make between political salience and slow transposition. 
They also show the sufficiency of administrative coordination for good transposition in the case of 
technical measures. 
 
 
The case studies: the politicized racial equality legislation versus the ‘technical’ vibration 
directive 
 
The transposition of the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC) 
 
Estonia 
The Estonian government had included the transposition of the Race Equality directive 
(2000/43/EC) in its pre-accession work plan. The directive, however, was not adopted by the 
Estonian Parliament and was delayed until the next parliament was elected. The next parliament 
proceeded to adopt the Gender Equality directive but not the Racial Equality directive, even though 
the two were initially linked in one legislative proposal. At the very last moment before 1
st of May, 
2004, an amendment was made of existing legislation as a stop-gap measure, in order to report that   20
the directive had been transposed.  The very last amendment to the employment contract law came 
into force on 1 May 2004.  
 
These measures were evaluated as insufficient as the Commission report of November 2004 
indicated Directive 2000/43/EC was not implemented. At the same time, the Estonian government 
suggested the directive did not need further legislation to be transposed as the Estonian Constitution 
contained a general ban on discrimination. The Commission did not accept this argument, as it had 
not accepted similar arguments in other member states
11 and Estonia received a formal letter of 
notification for non compliance with the Racial Equality Directive in 2006. New legislation 
transposing the directive was eventually adopted as late as December 2008. 
 
The process, as briefly described above, shows that Estonia had problems with transposition which 
have been political rather than administrative. The adoption by the Estonian parliament of measures 
transposing the Gender Equality Directive but not the Racial Equality Directive, even though these 
were initially included in the same legislative proposal, is a clear indication of this.  
 
The Czech Republic 
 
The Czech Republic produced two draft anti discrimination laws, one from 2005-2006 and another 
from 2007-2008. Neither has been successfully adopted so far. Both drafts included several anti 
discrimination directives at once and aimed at transposing them together in one comprehensive law. 
The debates on the drafts, however, were slowed down by issue linkage, the most disputed 
provisions in the Czech case being gender anti discrimination provisions.  
 
The Czech government started working on anti discrimination legislation as early as 2002 when the 
first draft was produced. In December 2005, already late for the 2004 deadline, the government 
approved it and in 2005 it was presented in the Czech Senate. It passed the required 3 readings in 
the Chamber of Deputies by December 2005, but in January in 2006 it was rejected by the Senate. 
After the Chamber of Deputies rejected the 2005/6 draft with the amendments by the Senate in May 
2006, in September 2007 a new government presented to Parliament a new, shorter, minimal draft 
of anti discrimination legislation. 
 
                                                 
11 For example, Germany which has been reluctant to adopt a general anti discrimination law.   21
Various arguments were presented against the law during parliamentary debates. Opponents 
claimed, for example, that there was no need for a single piece of legislation and that existing Czech 
legislation already provided sufficient anti discrimination protection. Others proposed to update 
existing laws in order to include anti discrimination legislation. The 2006/7 draft was also criticized 
as it did not include essential provisions for example setting up an anti discrimination agency and 
also missed an extended definition of direct discrimination. 
 
The debate in Parliament reflected societal polarization, especially about the need for gender anti 
discrimination provisions. The second draft passed debates which dealt also with issues such as the 
shift of burden of proof in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies and was finally approved after 3
rd 
reading in April 2008. However, in May 2008, the President refused to sign the law and this it was 
returned back to Parliament. In cases when the president has used his veto, the Czech Chamber of 
Deputies can overrule his decision by an absolute majority and adopt the law. However, in June 
2008, the Chamber of Deputies postponed the new debate on the law. The Czech Republic has still 
not managed to pass legislation transposing the anti discrimination directives. 
 
Hungary 
 
Hungary introduced a general law on anti discrimination, the Act CXXV of 2003 on Equal 
Treatment and the Promotion on Equal Opportunities (ETA). The law came into force in early 
2004. The protection provided by the law is strengthened by Articles 76 and 84 of Act IV of 1959 
of the Civil Code, which list the right to non-discrimination among the so-called “inherent rights” 
and prescribe specific sanctions for the infringement of such rights.  
 
The ETA addresses a broad range of societal actors such as NGOs as well as the Hungarian state. It 
covers a broad range of prohibitions, including all the prohibitions mentioned in 7 different EU 
directives which are explicitly referred to at the end. The law also explicitly mentions that it has 
been adopted in compliance with Hungary’s EU related obligations. 
 
The Hungarian law establishes an independent Equal Treatment Authority with the task of dealing 
with anti discrimination complaints, to initiate lawsuits and other broad powers. The Authority is an 
administrative body functioning under the supervision of the Government with an authorisation to 
act against any discriminatory act irrespective of the ground of discrimination (sex, age, race, etc.) 
or the field concerned (employment, education, access to goods, etc.). From the comprehensive way   22
in which the law tackles the anti discrimination issue, it can be concluded that Hungary complied 
with the Racial Equality Directive not only on time but also completely. 
 
Latvia 
 
Latvia did not adopt a single anti-discrimination law. The Labour Law from 2001 was amended as 
late as 2005 in order to comply with the Racial Equality Directive and the Employment Equality 
Directive (2000/78/EC). A number of other relevant laws contain non-discrimination clauses 
covering exhaustive or open lists of prohibited grounds of discrimination, but none of these laws 
covers entire scope of the Directives. The fragmented nature of the adopted or amended provisions 
does not ensure effective implementation and in this way Latvia does not comply with a 
requirement that the law should address all grounds of discrimination as stated down in the 
Directive.  
 
According to the European Commission report (2007) Latvia is among those 17 member states that 
have received a reasoned opinion for incorrect transposition of Directive 2000/43/EC and a 
complementary letter of formal notice concerning the Directive 2000/78/EC. The main areas of 
problematic transposition as identified by the Commission are the complex notions of the Directives 
(e.g. direct and indirect discrimination etc.) and their application to the domestic laws. Latvia did 
not transpose the directive on time and adequately despite its well developed EU coordination 
system. 
 
In contrast to the Racial Equality Directive, the second measure we examine is a typical ‘technical’ 
directive and its transposition remained firmly the job of administrative actors. 
 
The transposition of the Vibration directive (2002/44/EC) 
 
Lithuania 
 
The Vibration Directive has been transposed in Lithuania using an administrative instrument: the 
“Order of the Ministry of Social Security and Labour of the Republic of Lithuania and of the 
Ministry of Health Care of the Republic of Lithuania: the regulations on workers protection to the 
risks arising from vibration”.
12  Transposition went well and was many month before the deadline.  
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There were two ministries that were dealing with the transposition of the directive. These were the 
Ministry of Social Security and Labour and the Ministry of Health Care (Socialins apsaugos ir 
darbo ministro & Sveikatos Apsaugos Ministro, 2004). Coordination between the two ministries did 
not present a problem given that Lithuania’s excellent coordination system was in place. 
 
Hungary 
 
Hungary also used an administrative measure, a ministerial decree to transpose the vibration 
directive: “Ministerial Decree number 22/2005 (24 June) of the Minister of Health on the minimum 
health and safety requirements for workers exposed to vibration at work”. The decree entered into 
force on 1 July, 2005, five days before the deadline. The leading Ministry responsible for its 
transposition was the Ministry of Health (Egészségügyi Minisztérium, 2005). 
 
Czech Republic 
 
The Czech Republic already had existing legislation on vibration values. This was the Government 
Order of 502/2000 about protection of health against vibration and noise. This act was amended in 
2004 by the Government Order 88/2004. This existing legislation, however, used different 
calculations for vibration than the vibration directive prescribes and they covered horizontal and 
vertical vibrations instead of hand-arm and whole-body vibrations ( Nařizeni vlady č. 502/2000 Sb, 
2002 and Nařizeni vlady č. 88/2004 Sb, 2004). In order to incorporate the 2002/44/EC vibration 
directive into national legislation, the Czech Republic used two amending acts. The main 
transposition instrument was the Government Order no. 148/2006 of the 15th of March 2006 on the 
protection of health against undesirable effects of noise and vibration amending the 65/1965 Labour 
Code and its 115/2000 amendment and amending the 258/2000 law on the protection of public 
health. This act replaced the former Government Orders 502/2000 and its amendment 88/2004. The 
Government Order 148/2006 came into force on 22 June 2006. The responsible Ministry was the 
Ministry of Health (Nařizeni vlady č. 148/2006 Sb, 2006).  
 
The second transposition act is Law 309/2006 amending additional requirements concerning health 
and safety in professional relations and providing health and safety in non-standard contracts (law 
on providing other conditions for health and safety). This Law was made by the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry and the Ministry of Health and came into force on the first of January 2007 (ZAKON 
309/2006, 2006).   24
 
With these amendments, the transposition of the vibration directive in the Czech Republic was 
complete, even though it took longer and was more complicated than in other new member states. 
 
Estonia 
 
Estonia transposed the vibration directive 2002/44/EC with the Regulation “Health and safety 
requirements for the working environments affected by vibration, maximum vibration limits for the 
working environments and the vibration measurement procedure (Government of the republic 
regulation number 109 of 12 April 2007”). This Regulation was more than 21 months too late, as it 
came into force on 30 April, 2007. The leading ministry is the ministry of social affairs (Sotsiaal 
Ministeerium, 2007). The limited empirical data we have indicates that the Estonian record in 
transposition was similarly late as the Czech one, although there was no politicization around the 
measure. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper explored the importance of administrative capacity, defined narrowly as coordination 
capacity for EU affairs, for transposition of EU directives in the new member states just around and 
after accession. Using a mixed method approach we investigated first the connection between 
coordination levels and transposition success in the aggregate and found it to be strong and robust. 
We did not expect, however, that the general success of transposition through the administrative 
level would help with the transposition of measures that have the potential of touching upon key 
constitutional issues, political party preferences or existing lines of polarization – in other words 
measures which had the potential to become highly salient for political actors. Therefore, in the 
second part of the paper, we used a comparative case study design to see if the salience of a 
directive can be related to problems with transposition. In this part, we found that the more 
politically controversial measures could not be transposed though the administrative level and they 
could be seriously delayed if the preferences of key political actors diverged. Therefore, we 
conclude that good administrative capacity, in the sense of good coordination of EU policy making 
is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for transposition. 
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Tracing the process of transposition through the short case studies illustrates well the findings of the 
second part of the analysis. The highly salient Racial Equality Directive and related 
antidiscrimination legislation have stumbled in Parliaments and encountered the opposition of 
conservative parties, sometimes these parties have been acting as veto players in government. The 
transposition and implementation of these directives is clearly a question of politics, a result that 
can be explained with the high salience of this legislation and with high levels of politicization. The 
less salient vibration directive was successfully transposed with administrative measures, although 
it was delayed in Estonia and the Czech Republic, where coordination capacity is lower. 
 
The results of the analysis in this paper fit well with the conclusion of those who found that 
administrative capacity was important during the pre-accession stage such as Hille and Knill (2006) 
and the excellent work by Zubek (2001, 2005, 2008). We have to be careful, however, extrapolating 
these results beyond a few years after accession, because a number of the new member states have 
downgraded their European coordination systems (World Bank, 2006). The accession to the EU 
was the political priority project, but this project has now given way to day-to-day politics and 
implementation challenges. Among the implementation challenges we can clearly identify the fact 
that even in countries which have been good performers so far, coordination and implementation 
centres in the government differ – the latter being often located in the Ministry of Justice. This 
arguably creates ‘Chinese walls’ between policy making and implementation and prevents civil 
servants from being involved in the monitoring of the legislation they may have participated in 
negotiating. 
 
Ultimately, administrative capacity remains an important foundation for good transposition, but, as 
these short case studies have shown, the explanation for transposition problems should be sought in 
the world of politics and not in administrative capacity issues.  
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